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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Sections 78-2-2(3)(e)(iv) 
and 63-46b-16 of the Utah Code.1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Board err in dismissing Adkins' Request because it failed to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted when viewed in the context of the more than 
eighteen-year record in Cause No. 160 and Adkins' failure to allege new evidence not known 
or foreseeable at the time of the entry of the 1976 Spacing Order in Cause No. 160-6? 
Standard of Review: In light of the extensive record already developed in Cause No. 
160 and the legislative grant of discretion to the Board to interpret and apply Utah's well-
spacing statute, the Board's determinations are to be affirmed if those determinations are 
reasonable and rational. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 
"Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3XeXiv) (Supp. 1995) and 63-46b-16 (1993 and Supp. 1995), respectively. 
Adkins contends that "no citations to the record under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(aX5)(A) are 
necessary to demonstrate that the issues have been preserved." Brief of Petitioner John Adkins, Jr. at 2. 
Arguably, the issues have not been preserved in so far as Adkins foiled to exhaust all available administrative 
remedies by requesting a rehearing from the Board as allowed by Rule R641-110-100 of the Board's Rules. 
Utah Admin. Code R64I-110-100 (1995). 
Rule 641-110-110 requires affected parties to exhaust the available remedies before the Board before 
they are allowed to seek judicial review of the Board's actions. Utah Admin. Code R641-114-110 (1995). 
Under the decision in Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct App. 1991), if an agency's 
roles permit parties to seek review of the agency's orders, but do not require requesting such review, the failure 
to seek a rehearing is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id at 463. 
UPRC believes that the Board's Rules are intended to provide permissive requests for rehearing. It must 
benpted, however, that the Heinecke decision has been questioned because it did not account for the language in 
Section 63-46b-14(2) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act requiring that judicial review is only available 
™ parties have exhausted all administrative remedies available. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Comm '/i, 
«60 P2d 944, 948 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). UPRC believes that the Heinecke decision presents the better 
policy regarding the practices and procedures before the Board. 
*»*»».i 1 
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1991); Tasters Ltd., v. Department ofEmp. Sec, 863 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). cert, 
denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
Adkins' Request seeks to radically modify the eighteen-year old spacing order entered 
in Cause No. 160 designating 80-acre drilling units for the Pineview Field. Adkins' Request 
is the 28th matter filed in Cause No. 160 since 1975. Because of the extensive factual record 
that already existed in Cause No. 160 prior to the filing of Adkins' Request, the Board's grant 
of UPRC's Motion to Dismiss presents some unique considerations regarding the standard of 
review. 
Section 63-46b-l(4)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act2 provides that the 
Board may grant a timely motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if the requirements of 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party. Normally, the 
propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, 
giving no particular deference to the trial court's determination. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital. 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). No deference is required because there 
is no body of established facts in the record and the correctness of such dismissal only 
involves matters of law. See id 
Unlike the initial pleadings phase of a civil proceeding or a normal formal proceeding 
before the Board, a request to modify an existing spacing order requires an inaugural factual 
determination regarding the allegations in the request, if those allegations are challenged by a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Modifications to existing spacing orders must be based on "additional 
'Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1993 and Supp. 1995). 
KlttMM.l 2 
evidence," Cowling v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah 1991), or a 
-substantial change of conditions." Wood v. Corporation Comm'n, 239 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Okla. 1950). Otherwise, such requests are collateral attacks on the existing orders. See 
generally Howard H. Harris, Modification of Corporation Commission Orders Pertaining to a 
Common Source of Supply, 11 Okla. L. Rev. 125, 132-33 (1958). A determination whether 
the allegations in Adkins' Request, if accepted as true, constitute "additional evidence" or a 
"substantial change of conditions" is required to determine whether Adkins' Request states a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. That determination must be consistent with Section 
40-6-6 of the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act (the "Oil and Gas Act" or "Act"), the statute 
controlling the establishment and modification of spacing orders and drilling units.3 
The Utah Legislature has granted discretion to the Board to interpret and apply the 
well-spacing statute. Section 40-6-6(1) of the Act provides that "[t]he board may order the 
establishment of drilling units for any pool."4 Section 40-6-6(5) of the Act provides that 
M[a]n order of the board that establishes drilling units for a pool shall . . . be made upon terms 
and conditions that are iust and reasonable . . . [and] specify the acreage and shape of each 
drilling unit as determined bv the board . . .."$ Language like "as determined by the board" 
indicates an express grant of discretion to the agency. Tasters Ltd, Inc. v. Department of 
Emp. Sec, 819 P.2d 362, 364 (Utah Ct App. 1991) cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
Broad and generalized language such as "just and reasonable" indicates an implied grant of 
'Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1993). 
4Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(1) (1993). 
'Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-6(5Xa), -6(5X0 (1993) (emphasis added). 
SW9M1.I 3 
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discretion and "bespeaks a legislative intent to delegate . . . interpretation [of the language] to 
the responsible agency." Morton Int'l, Inc., 814 P.2d at 588. Accordingly, the Utah 
Legislature has expressly and impliedly granted discretion to the Board to interpret and apply 
the well-spacing statute. In addition, because modification of an existing spacing order to 
change the acreage and shape of a drilling unit necessarily depends upon the Board's 
discretionary determinations, the legislative discretionary grant must extend to Section 40-6-
6(c) of the Act as well.6 Because the Utah Legislature has granted discretion to the Board to 
interpret and apply the well-spacing statute, this Court should not disturb the Board's 
determinations unless those determinations "exceedQ the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Morton Int'l, Inc., 814 P.2d at 587-88. 
2. Did the Board err in dismissing Adkins' Request because of Adkins' failure to 
provide notice to each person known to have a direct interest in the requested agency action, 
as required by Rule R641-104-135 of the Board's Rules?7 
Standard of Review: In reviewing an agency's application of its own rules, the 
appellate court reviews for reasonableness and rationality. Kent v. Dept. ofEmp. Sec, 860 
P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. Ct 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The full text of the determinative law can be found in the Addendum. 
'Section 40-6-6(c) of the Utah Code provides that the Board may modify an existing order to increase or 
decrease the size of drilling units. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(c) (1993). 
'Utah Admin. Code R641-104-135 (1995). 
RtXIKJl.l 4 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 (1993). 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-2(2) (1993). 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-6 (1993). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) (Supp. 1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46M4 (1993). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993 and Supp. 1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 79-2-2(3)(e)(iv) (Supp. 1995). 
Roles 
Utah Administrative Code R641-104-135 (1995). 
Utah Administrative Code R641-110-100 (1995). 
Utah Administrative Code R641-114-300 (1995). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (1994) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Petitioner John Adkins, Jr. seeks review of the April 21, 1995 Order of the Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Board") dismissing Adkins' Request for Agency Action 
("Request"), which sought, among other things, modification of an eighteen-year old spacing 
order entered by the Board in 1976. That order spaced the wells in the Pineview Field in 
2*1*11 .1 5 
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Summit County, Utah, on the basis of 80-acre drilling units.1 Based on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion by Respondent Union Pacific Resources Company ("UPRC*), the Board dismissed 
Adkins* Request because the Request failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
and because Adkins failed to provide notice to all parties known to have a direct interest in 
the requested agency action in accordance with Utah Admin. Code R641-104-135. 
B. The Entry of the 1976 Spacing Order. 
Shortly after the discovery of the Pineview Field in 1975, the Board established 
uniform 160-acre drilling units covering the Nugget formation over the entire Pineview pool. 
The original spacing order was entered March 19, 1975 in Cause No. 160-1. All of Adkins* 
land and minerals in the SEKSEK of Section 34, Township 3 North, Range 7 East, S.L.M. 
(the "Adkins Property"), was covered by that 160-acre spacing order. The 1975 Spacing 
Order also covered all of UPRC's mineral interests in Section 3, Township 2 North, Range 7 
East, S.L.M. UPRC, the successor to Champlin Petroleum, is the present operator of the 
Pineview Field and is a mineral interest owner in the lands subject to Adkins* Request. In 
March 1976, the Board extended the 1975 Spacing Order for one year. 
By Order entered July 28, 1976, in Cause No. 160-6 (the "1976 Spacing Order"), the 
Board reduced the spacing of the Pineview Field, including the Adkins' Property, to 80-acre 
drilling units. (A copy of the 1976 Spacing Order is attached to the Brief of Petitioner John 
Adkins, Jr. (Petitioner's Brief) as Tab 7). The 1976 Spacing Order was based on an 
"A drilling unit is the area prescribed by the Act for the granting of a permit to drill a well. See 8 Howard 
R. Williams and Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law 318 (1995). "Once the Board has established a drilling 
unit, a landowner's correlative rights can be determined based on his or her share of the total surface ownership 
within a particular drilling unit" Bennion v. Graham Resources, Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 570-71 (Utah 1993) 
(quoting Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah 1991)). 
zaxtKii.t 6 
extensive record, including a two-day public hearing at which the Board considered testimony 
and other evidence both in support of and in opposition to the 80-acre spacing. For example, 
the structural and physical characteristics of the reservoir were considered. (See e.g., 
Transcript of Hearing, Cause No. 160-6, July 28, 1976, at 24, 26, 110-115 (structure), 38-39 
(permeability).)9 Both the location of the oil/water contact and the nature of the reservoir 
drive mechanism were carefully addressed at the hearing. (See e.g., id 24-26, 30, 50-51, 
176). Champlin's witness testified that the reservoir was being swept by an active water 
drive. (Id. at 52.) Effective communication and drainage between nearby wells was also 
considered, as was the necessity to drill off-set wells to protect against drainage. (See e.g., id. 
179-80.) Drainage caused by the encroachment of water along the edges of the pool due to 
ongoing production and the impact of such drainage to correlative rights was also considered. 
(See e.g>, id. 128-29, 230.) The Board's 1976 Spacing Order is obviously based on 
substantial evidence in the record. 
The 1976 Spacing Order contains the following findings of fact: 
2. In order to afford each owner of an interest in production from the 
subject lands an opportunity to protect his respective correlative right to 
produce the share of recoverable hydrocarbons initially in place under his 
respective tract, drilling and spacing units should consist of the N-l/2 and S-l/2 
of each quarter section and the permitted well location for each such drilling 
and spacing unit shall be located in the center of the NW-1/4 and the center of 
the SE-1/4 of each quarter section with the tolerance of 200 feet in any 
direction when surface topography makes it necessary. 
'Petitioner Adkins has not met his burden of marshalling all of the evidence in the record that supports the 
Board's determinations and showing how, despite the supporting facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. See First Nat'I Bank v. 
County Bd of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
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8. That 80-acre drilling and spacing units best accommodate, for the 
purposes of prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights, the existing 
development in the field, future development in the field, and has the effect of 
maximizing ultimate future recovery of oil and associated hydrocarbons. 
(Order in Cause No. 160-6, Findings of Fact Nos. 2 and 8, emphasis added.) 
Both Adkins and his lessee, Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") were personally 
served with notice of the 1976 spacing proceeding and had an opportunity to participate and 
appeal the Board's Order. Neither Adkins nor Amoco appealed the 80-acre spacing order at 
that time. The 1976 Spacing Order has been the operative spacing order for the Pineview 
Field for 18 years, and the mineral interests in the Pineview Field are still covered by that 
order. Since 1976 there have been numerous other hearings and proceedings involving the 
regulation of the Pineview Field. Adkins* Request is the 28th matter in Cause No. 160. 
C. Other Board Proceedings Affecting Adkins* Correlative Rights, 
In addition to the proceedings in Cause No. 160, there have been other proceedings in 
other causes before the Board that involve the regulation of the Pineview Field and the 
correlative rights of mineral interest owners in that field. For example, by order entered May 
28, 1992, in Cause No. UIC-128, the Board approved UPRC's request to use the Bingham & 
Sons #1 Well located in Section 2, Township 2 North, Range 7 East, S.L.M., as a Class II 
injection well. (A copy of the Order Granting Administrative Approval of Bingham & Sons 
til Well as a Class II Injection Well (the "UIC Order") is attached to UPRC's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss as Exhibit 2 ).'° (R. 81.) The Bingham & Sons #1 Well is 
located within the area subject to the 1976 Spacing Order. Adkins appeared at and 
,0Thc injection well is used to dispose of salt water produced from the nearby producing wells. See UIC 
Order, Findings of Fact No. 2.) 
?mnwi i 8 
participated in the 1992 injection well proceeding. In approving the injection well, the Board 
determined "[t]hat the mineral interests owned by the Protestant [Adkins] in the Pineview 
Field lie beneath the oil/water contact, and therefore outside the area where commercial 
production is possible." (R. 83.) 
D. Production History of the Pineview Field. 
According to the records of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Division"), 
approximately 20 wells have been drilled and completed in the Nugget formation within the 
area spaced by the 1976 Spacing Order. While it may be true that the wells located on the 
crest of the Pineview anticlinal structure, including the Bingham #1-42-3 Well, are the most 
prolific producers, significant production has also occurred off the crest of the structure. 
Eleven wells, most of which are located in the approved well locations on the flank of the 
structure, have cumulatively produced more than 3 million barrels of oil and significant 
volumes of gas. Adkins did not refute the evidence in the Division's records. The Division 
records are consistent with the Board's 1976 Spacing Order and demonstrate that the Pineview 
Field is being efficiently and economically produced based on 80-acre spacing. 
The Adkins Property has not contributed to this production because no well has ever 
been drilled on that property, although Adkins has always had available a drilling location to 
develop his mineral interests. (R. 2.) Although Adkins has leased his property at least twice, 
he apparently has never sought relief against his lessees for failure to drill his land and to 
protect his mineral interests from drainage. 
awssiu 9 
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E. Adkins* Request for Agency Action. 
On December 9, 1994, Adkins filed his Request for Agency seeking a hearing bciore 
the Board. (R. 1.) Adkins" Request stated the following claims for relief: 
1. That a hearing be held on the issue of Union Pacific's liability 
for the production of oil and gas from the SEViSEVi of Section 34 through the 
Union Pacific well, Bingham 1-42-3, in the SEViNEVi of Section 3 in the 
Pineview field. 
2. That the spacing order for the Pineview field be modified to 
include a unit of 200 acres comprised of the SEV4SEV4 of Section 34 and the 
NEVi of Section 3. 
3. If the parties should be unable to agree to pool their interests in 
the 200 acre unit, that a second hearing be held and that the Board pool the 
parties' interests in the 200 acre unit retroactive to the 1975 spacing order for 
the Pineview field. 
4. That John Adkins receive a monetary award against Union 
Pacific in the amount of his free of cost l/8th royalty on production from the 
NEVi of Section 3 and of his share of the production, less his share of costs, 
from first production in 1976 to the date of the hearing, together with interest. 
5. That an order be entered that John Adkins shall receive his 
proportionate share of the production from the 200 acre unit from the date of 
the hearing and for as long thereafter as production continues from the unit. 
(R. 1-2, emphasis added.) Adkins' Request essentially sought a share in the past and future 
production from the lands owned by UPRC in the NEV* of Section 3, even though Adkins 
owns no mineral interests in those lands and the lands are not included in the drilling unit 
encompassing Adkins' mineral interests. To provide Adkins with a proportionate share of the 
production, the Request sought an order modifying the 1976 Spacing Order to create a non-
uniform 200-acre drilling unit that combines Adkins' 40-acre tract with UPRC's lands to the 
south, and to make that new order retroactive to the date of the 1975 Spacing Order. A 
tavnuii 10 
II 
forced pooling order covering the new spacing order would then be made retroactive to the 
date of the 1975 Spacing Order. 
Adkins' Request contains the following material factual allegations:11 
3. No well has been drilled on the Adkins land. 
14.[sic] The producing well that Champlin completed in 1976, the 
Bingham 1-42-3, in the SEKNEVi of Section 3 is situated directly south of the 
Adkins land 
15.[sic] The Nugget formation has produced with a fairly strong water 
drive. As oil was produced from the reservoir, it was replaced by water 
encroaching along the edges of the field. To the extent that water encroached 
on "edge" wells in the reservoir (such as the McDonald 1-31-3 in the 
NWViNEVi of Section 3, they produced only a fraction of the recoverable oil 
under their respective units. 
16.[sic] The water drive caused all of the movable oil in the Adkins 
land in the Nugget formation to migrate south to the NEVi of Section 3. 
17.[sic] Since 1976, the Nugget formation has been developed on 80 
acre spacing. In hindsight, the reservoir has effectively produced on 260 acre 
spacing through the five largest producers in the field. 
Bingham 1-42-3 (SEViNEVi of Section 3) 3.0 million barrels 
UPRR 3-3 (NWViSEVS of Section 3) 1.9 million barrels 
UPRR 3-6 (SEViSEVi of Section 3) 3.0 million barrels 
Bingham 2-1 (NWViSWV* of Section 2) 2.2 million barrels 
Bingham 2-1A (SWViSEVi of Section 2) 1.4 million barrels 
18.[sic] The Adkins oil in the SE1ASEVA of Section 34 was and is being 
effectively produced and saved from Union Pacific's Bingham 1-42-3 well situated in 
the NEVi of Section 3. 
for rttf ^ L ^ f bfCVity' u*" ""? a t i o n s *»" ""« o m f t t e d ****** *ey do not directly relate to a claim f o r ^ e f because they were obvtously known at the time of the 1976 spacing proceeding or toy are conclusions 
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20.[sic] Mr. Adkins has received no share of the oil had gas from his 
land that has been and is being produced and saved effectively from the NE14 
of Section 3. 
21.[sic] Union Pacific, as the sole owner of the oil in the NEVi of 
Section 3, has received and will continue to receive all of the benefits of the 
production from the SE'/iSE1/* of Section 34. 
22.[sic] Union Pacific has been enriched to the extent of the 
compensation that Union Pacific has received from the production of the oil 
from the SEV&SEVS of Section 34 through Union Pacific's well in the NEtf of 
Section 3. 
Union Pacific Resources Company has been mailed a copy of the 
foregoing request for agency action as the only person who could be adversely 
affected financially by the outcome of this matter and, therefore, the person 
known to have a direct interest herein. 
Under the 1976 Spacing Order, the only permissible drilling location in the 80-acre 
drilling unit encompassing the Adkins Property is on Adkins* 40-acre tract. (R- 11, 73-74.) 
Adkins did not notify the mineral interest owners of the other 40-acre tract in that drilling 
unit (See R. 9.) 
The Adkins Request does not contain an allegation of any fraud or inequitable conduct 
by UPRC as the operator of the Pineview Field or the Bingham #1-42-3 Well, or in the 1976 
spacing proceedings. Adkins concedes that "the 'conduct1 exception discussed in Cowling is 
irrelevant to the relief requested by Adkins." Petitioner's Brief at 25.12 
"Adkins alleged that UPRC (Champlin) held an interest in the Amoco and Wells leases covering the Adkins 
Property prior to their expiration. Adkins* Request at 1 2. Adkins* allegation is mistaken. In any case, Adkins 
claims before the Board are not based on the leases, therefore, the allegation is irrelevant to Adkins' Request. 
zztxnui.i 1-^ 
F. The Board's Order Dismissing the Adkins Request. 
Pursuant to the Board's Rules," UPRC filed a Response to Adkins' Request with the 
Board. On January 17, 1995, UPRC filed a Motion to Dismiss Adkins' Request, together 
with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion. Following further 
briefing and a public hearing on February 22, 1995, the Board granted UPRC's Motion to 
Dismiss. The Board dismissed Adkins' Request because: (1) it failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted; and (2) because Adkins failed to provide adequate notice to all 
interested parties, as required by the Board's Rules. (R. 185-86.) Adkins did not seek a 
rehearing of the Board's Order dismissing the Request, as allowed by Rule R641-110-100 of 
the Board's Rules.14 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Board properly dismissed Adkins' Request Adkins failed to state a claim upon 
which either retroactive or prospective relief could be granted by the Board. There is no set 
of facts under which the Board could grant the retroactive relief requested by Adkins. 
Adkins* Request constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the 1976 Spacing Order. As 
such, it is barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of collateral attack and comparable 
principles of res judicata protecting the finality of administrative agency decisions. The Board 
properly refused to allow Adkins to relitigate the same claims and issues that were settled by 
the 1976 Spacing Order, which he attacks. 
"Utah Admin. Code R64M04-160 (1995). 
"Utah Admin. Code R641-110-100 (1995). 
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The Board properly recognized that it has no authority to retroactively modify an 
existing spacing order prior to the date on which the application for modification is made, in 
the absence of any allegation of fraud or inequitable conduct. Adkins makes no allegations of 
fraud or inequitable conduct, and therefore, there is simply no basis in law that would allow 
modification of a spacing order to be made retroactive to the date of first production. 
The Board properly dismissed Adkins" Request insofar as it sought prospective 
modification of the 1976 Spacing Order, because Adkins failed to allege sufficient facts to 
support modification of that order. Adkins relies solely on the same evidence presented at the 
1976 spacing proceeding. By basing his requests for modification on the same evidence, he 
improperly makes a collateral attack on the 1976 Spacing Order. The Board's determination 
that Adkins failed to allege any information that was not already considered during the 1976 
spacing proceeding or that did not reasonably follow from that information, was reasonable 
and rational and must be affirmed by this Court. Furthermore, Adkins* express allegation that 
no oil exists under his land precluded the Board, as a matter of law, from modifying the 1976 
Spacing Order to include the Adkins Property in a new drilling unit. 
Finally, the Board properly dismissed Adkins* Request because Adkins failed to 
provide notice to all interested parties in accordance with the Board's regulations. Adkins 
provided no notice to any interested parties other than UPRC. The Board's rules expressly 







I THE BOARD PROPERLY GRANTED UPRC'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
[ BECAUSE ADKINS CANNOT PROVE THAT HE IS ENTITLED 
TO RETROACTIVE RELIEF UNDER ANY SET OF FACTS. 
The Board properly dismissed Adkins' Request for retroactive relief. The Board 
! 
I recognized that Adkins "is seeking to collaterally attack the 1976 order for purposes of setting 
1 it aside and substituting retroactively a new spacing order." (R 198.) In considering UPRC's 
' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the Board was required to accept the factual allegations in 
Adkins' Request as true and to consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn from them 
in a light most favorable to Adkins. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 
[ 194, 196 (Utah 1991).15 However, the Board's dismissal of Adkins* Request should be 
affirmed if it appears that Adkins cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims. 
! Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert denied, 883 P.2d 
1359 (Utah 1994). Because collateral attacks are barred as a matter of law, there is no set of 
facts that will support Adkins' claim for retroactive relief, and the Board properly dismissed 
his claim. 
A- Adkins' Claims Are Barred by the Doctrines 
of Collateral Attack and Res Judicata. 
The Board properly determined that Adkins* Request was an improper collateral attack 
on the 1976 Spacing Order. The Board's ruling that there is no basis in law or equity to 
support Adkins' request for retroactive pooling relief to the date of the 1975 Spacing Order 
Allegations in Adkins* Request that are conclusions of law may be disregarded. Tydeman v. Flaherty, 868 
P-2d 755, 757 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
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necessarily follows. {See R. 198.) Dismissal on these grounds was proper because Adkins' 
claims for retroactive relief are a collateral attack on the 1976 Spacing Order and seek to 
completely disrupt the existing substantive rights in the Pineview Field that were determined 
by the final adjudication of that order. 
The doctrine of collateral attack is comparable to the doctrine of res judicata. As this 
Court has observed, res judicata, both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, prevents 
relitigation of issues previously decided, and "is premised on the principle that a controversy 
should be adjudicated only once." Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245, 
1251 (Utah 1992). Substantive rights once fixed cannot be relitigated. The doctrines of 
collateral attack and res judicata apply to administrative agency decisions. Id. Administrative 
proceedings, such as spacing proceedings, resolve the competing legal rights and remedies of 
different owners and such administrative decisions require finality. A/.16 Adkins" claims for 
retroactive relief are barred under the principles of collateral attack and res judicata because 
Adkins* Request seeks to relitigate exactly the claims and issues that were settled in the 1976 
spacing proceeding, as well as subsequent proceedings in Cause No. 160. 
Both Adkins and his lessee, Amoco, were personally served with notice of the 1976 
spacing proceeding. Amoco appeared and participated at the hearing, but Adkins chose not to 
participate. Adkins and his lessee had a fair opportunity to argue their version of the facts 
'*The United States Supreme Court has observed: 
When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of 
fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts 
have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose. 
United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560 (1966). 
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and applicable law. The Board was not persuaded to retain the 160-acre spacing and ordered 
the spacing in the Pineview Field reduced to 80-acre drilling units. Neither Adkins nor his 
lessee appealed the 1976 Spacing Order. The 1976 Spacing Order is final and defines the 
correlative rights in the 80-acre drilling units in the Pineview Field. As the Board's Order 
dismissing Adkins* Request properly notes, "Petitioner's request for pooling seeks relief 
retroactively to the 1976 spacing order on which all other parties subject to the spacing order 
have relied for 18 years." (R. 198.) Adkins is bound by the 1976 Spacing Order until it is 
properly modified on a prospective-only basis according to "additional evidence" or a 
"substantial changed condition." Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 
225 (Utah 1991); Wood v. Corporation Comm'n, 239 P.2d 1023, 1023 (Okla. 1950). 
To modify the 1976 retroactively would amount to the Board simply "changing its 
mind" about a point already determined, and would be a collateral attack on the 1976 Spacing 
Order, as well as an arbitrary act. See 1 Bruce M. Kramer and Patrick H. Martin, The Law of 
Pooling and Unitization § 14.02, at 14-7 (3d ed. 1994). The Board cannot now, on the basis 
of the same evidence available in 1976, reconsider the 80-acre spacing order retroactively, 
particularly when subsequent events have proven that the Board's earlier determination was 
correct. 
A modification of the 1976 Spacing Order can only have prospective effect because 
such a modification would have to be based on new issues of fact that were not previously 
litigated in the 1976 spacing proceeding. Such new issues of fact cannot be used to obtain 
retroactive relief. Allowing retroactive modification would prevent spacing orders and the 
determination of correlative rights from ever becoming final. Moreover, a retroactive 
a*vi»a.i 1 7 
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modification would require taking away substantive property rights. Rights, that in this 
instance, have existed for eighteen years. The doctrines of collateral attack and res judicata 
simply do not allow a party to substitute new facts for facts already determined. Absent 
allegations of fraud or inequitable conduct (and none have been alleged by Adkins), no 
possible set of facts, let alone the facts alleged in Adkins* Request, will support replacing an 
existing spacing order retroactively. See Hystad v. Mid-Con Expl. Co., 489 N.W.2d 571, 574-
76 (N.D. 1992). 
B. The Board Does Not Have the Authority 
to Grant Adkins* Request for 
Retroactive Relief. 
The Board properly dismissed Adkins' Request by determining that "[i]n the absence 
of inequitable conduct, there is no authority under the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act to 
retroactively modify an existing spacing order prior to the date on which the application for 
modification was made." (R. 200.) Under the Oil and Gas Act, there is no explicit authority 
to retroactively date a spacing order. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-6 and 40-6-6.5 (1993). 
Absent fraud or inequitable conduct, there is simply no basis in Utah law, or under any 
known precedent, that would allow a new modified spacing order to be made retroactive 
earlier than the date the original application for modification of a spacing order was filed and 
served. In fact, the Board's authority to modify an existing spacing order and make that new 
order retroactive is limited by the Utah Constitution. Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law."17 Because spacing orders determine different mineral interest owners* 
"Utah Const, art I, § 7. 
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correlative rights, and the modification of such orders necessarily impacts interests in 
property, such orders may not be made retroactive before the date when an application for 
modification is made. Boyce v. Corporation Comm'n ofOkla., 744 P.2d 985 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1987); American Operating Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 744 S.W.2d. 149 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1987). See generally 5 Eugene Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 70.4, at 382 (1991). 
Spacing orders affect substantive property rights and interests, and these rights cannot be 
affected without providing proper notice and adequate due process. See Uhden v. New 
Mexico Oil Corner. Comm'n, 817 P.2d 721, 723 (N.M. 1991) (spacing proceeding wherein 
fee owner's property right was worthy of constitutional protection). 
Adkins essentially seeks to utilize a spacing hearing to adjudicate a drainage claim 
against a land owner in a non-adjacent drilling unit A spacing proceeding before the Board 
is not a proper forum to adjudicate such a claim. Spacing proceedings and orders determine 
correlative rights in a pool of oil or gas. Cowling v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 
220, 225 (Utah 1991). Spacing orders establish field-wide drilling units, which are 
determined by the Board to be not smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and 
economically drained by one well. Id. Once the Board determines the size of the drilling 
units necessary to drain the reservoir efficiently, the "[ljandowners' correlative rights are then 
definable based on each landowner's fractional share of the total surface ownership within a 
particular drilling unit" Id, at 226 (emphasis added). As a matter of law, there is no 
drainage between adjacent drilling units, and an operator of one particular drilling unit is not 
liable for drainage of landowners in adjacent drilling units. 
19 
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The determination of correlative rights does not "give a mineral interest owner an 
absolute right to all the oil or gas under one's land." Cowling, 830 P.2d at 225. Individual 
correlative rights are "dependent upon the overriding objective of obtaining the greatest 
production possible from the pool, and not from any particular well or property." Id. Thus, 
the overriding purpose of the 1976 Spacing Order is to maximize ultimate recovery from the 
Pineview Field based on 80-acre drilling units and avoid leaving hydrocarbons in the ground. 
It is not the purpose o f spacing to protect Adkins' right to drill at any time. 
The 1976 Spacing Order created drilling units based on a compensatory drainage 
pattern" covering all o f the mineral interests in the Pineview Field, including the Adkins 
Property. The 1976 Spacing Order is based on an extensive record supported by substantial 
evidence, following proper notice, and a two-day public hearing. The spacing order provides 
that 80-acre spacing is necessary to prevent waste, to protect correlative rights, and to 
maximize the ultimate future recovery of oil and associated hydrocarbons from the Pineview 
Field. (Order in Cause 160-6, Finding of Fact No . 8; Conclusions of Law Nos. 5 and 6.) By 
issuing the 1976 Spacing Order, the Board provided Adkins with the opportunity to produce 
his equitable and just share of oil and gas from the Pineview Field, and, thereby protected 
Adkins' correlative rights. Cowling, 830 P.2d at 225-26. Adkins never drilled a well to 
protect his correlative rights. (R. 2.) Having upheld its statutory duty to protect correlative 
rights and prevent waste, the Board need not ensure a share of production of the Pineview 
"Such drainage patterns assume uniform drainage and that each permitted well location will be drilled 
Mineral interest owners are expected to attempt to produce their share of the available hydrocarbons and to 
protect themselves against drainage. 
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Field to Adkins. Id. at 225. The Board properly determined that Adkins* claims for 
retroactive relief were not properly based on Utah Oil and Gas Conservation law. 
The Board's authority to modify its existing spacing orders is also limited by the 
statutory language of the Act. Section 40-6-6(6) of the Act19 authorizes the Board to 
"modify" an existing spacing order. The plain meaning o f the term "modify" is to change 
slightly or partially in character. See e.g., Webster's New World Dictionary 872 (3d. College 
ed. 1988). Adkins* claims for retroactive relief would require the Board to change completely 
the 1976 Spacing Order as it affects Adkins* and UPRC's drilling units. The statutory 
language does not explicitly provide for such radical modification of spacing orders, nor 
could i t Such a retroactive radical change would violate the affected mineral owners' rights 
to due process. 
Finally, as a matter o f policy, making a new modified spacing order effective before 
the date the application to modify the existing order was filed would create a horrible 
precedent. Such a precedent would undermine all of the correlative rights determined by such 
spacing orders. Because modifications of spacing orders redetermine correlative rights, 
retroactively modifying a spacing order to become effective as of the date of the original 
spacing order would create a situation in which two different parties can legitimately make a 
claim to the same oil and gas. Under these circumstances, a landowner or an operator, who 
has the duty to account to adjacent landowners within a common drilling unit, would never be 
able to rely on the finality of the ownership interests determined by a spacing order. 
"Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (1993). 
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Adkins' proposed modification of the 1976 Spacing Order cannot be made retroactive 
to the date of first production from the Bingham #1-42-3 Well, and Adkins* claim to past 
production is fatally flawed as a matter of law, regardless of Adkins* alleged facts. The 
Board properly dismissed Adkins' Request on the basis that his claim for retroactive relief 
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
II. 
THE ALLEGATIONS IN ADKINS' REQUEST DO NOT 
SUPPORT PROSPECTIVE RELIEF. 
A. The Allegations in Adkins* Request Dp Not 
Present New Evidence that Will 
Support Adkins' Claims for 
Prospective Relief. 
The Board properly dismissed Adkins* Request because the Request sought 
modification of an eighteen-year-old spacing order without presenting or alleging any 
information that was not known or not foreseeable at the time the Board issued the 1976 
Spacing Order. (R. 200.) The Board properly determined that Adkins had not alleged 
sufficient facts to support the modification of the 1976 Spacing Order. (R. at id) Adkins* 
Request relies only on the same evidence available at the original spacing proceeding in 1976, 
and as such, is merely an untimely attempt to appeal the Board's 1976 Spacing Order. 
Adkins alleges that "[t]he Nugget formation has produced with a fairly strong water 
drive." (R. 6.) This is not new information. The Board considered the existence and effect 
of the water drive in the Nugget formation during the 1976 proceeding and decided to grant 
Champlin's request for 80-acre drilling units. The Board determined that H80 acre drilling 
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and spacing units best accommodate, for the purposes of prevention of waste and protection 
of correlative rights, the existing development in the field, future development of the field, 
and has the effect of maximizing ultimate future recovery of oil and associated hydrocarbons." 
(Order in Cause 160-6, Finding of Fact No. 8; see also Conclusions of Law Nos. 5 and 6.) 
Adkins* allegation merely establishes that the Board's 1976 determinations were correct 
As discussed above, to modify the existing 1976 spacing order based only on evidence 
available in 1976 would amount to the Board simply "changing its mind" about a point 
already determined, and would be a collateral attack on the 1976 Spacing Order. Moreover, 
because Adkins now seeks relief that would have a severe negative impact on parties that 
have reasonably relied upon the 1976 Spacing Order to determine their correlative rights and 
mineral interests for eighteen years, Adkins* showing of changed conditions, such as new 
information or knowledge, must be correspondingly greater than if the modification of the 
spacing order would have no negative impact See 1 Bruce M Kramer and Patrick H. Martin, 
The Law of Pooling and Unitization § 14.02, at 14-7 (3d ed. 1994). Even if all of the 
allegations in his Request are assumed to be true, and are considered in the light most 
favorable to Adkins, Adkins did not met his burden of alleging facts that demonstrate a 
"substantial changed condition." 
It would be improper for the Board to reconsider the 80-acre spacing order on the 
basis of the same evidence available in 1976. The Pineview Field has behaved as expected, 
and Adkins has not provided a basis for modifying the 1976 Spacing Order. Without a 
showing of changed conditions, such as new information or knowledge that was not available 
31
 the time of the original spacing proceeding, Adkins' Request is simply an untimely appeal 
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of the 1976 spacing order. As such, it is an improper collateral attack on the Board's existing 
spacing order. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of the State of Okla, 771 
P.2d 201, 203 (Okla. 1989). 
The determination of what constitutes new information or knowledge sufficient to 
support the modification of an existing spacing order is within the discretion of the Board. 
Under the well-spacing statute, the Board must determine the acreage and shape of drilling 
units. Utah Code Ann § 40-6-6(1) (1993). As this Court has previously observed: 
The Board's determination of the size of the drilling units in a field is 
necessarily a discretionary determination based on the acreage that wells in the 
field can efficiently drain so as to maximize production from the pool as a 
whole and minimize the waste of oil and gas. See § 40-6-6(1). The 
determination must, however, be based on geologic and reservoir engineering 
evidence pertaining to a number of factors . . . . 
Cowling v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 225-26 (Utah 1991). The 
determination whether geologic or reservoir engineering evidence constitutes new information 
that will support modifying an existing spacing order is also a discretionary determination. 
As previously argued, the Utah Legislature has expressly and impliedly granted discretion to 
the Board to interpret and apply the well-spacing statute. The Board's determination that 
Adkins' allegations, even if they are accepted as true, do not constitute "additional evidence" 
or a "substantial changed condition" is consistent with Utah conservation law, and is both 
reasonable and rational because Adkins has not alleged any information that was not already 
considered during the 1976 spacing proceeding or that does not reasonably follow from the 
information considered during that proceeding, e.g., that the water drive would cause free oil 
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to migrate updip in the Pineview structure. This Court should affirm the Board's 
interpretation and application of the well-spacing statute. 
B. Adkins' Allegations that AH of the Recoverable 
Hydrocarbons Beneath His Lands Have 
Migrated to UPRC's Lands Precluded 
the Board from Including His Acreage 
in A New Drilling Unit. 
The Board properly dismissed Adkins' requests for prospective relief by determining 
that Adkins failed to allege any mineral interests or correlative rights in the drilling unit 
produced by the Bingham #1-42-3 Well, which would support a claim to production from that 
well. (R* 184.) Adkins alleges that M[t]he water drive caused all of the moveable oil in the 
Adkins land in the Nugget formation to migrate south to the NEV4 of Section 3." (R. 6.) 
Assuming for the purposes of UPRC's Motion to Dismiss 
that Adkins* allegation is true, then Adkins has alleged that the Adkins Property is barren and 
contains no recoverable oil. Under the Oil and Gas Act, this fact precluded the Board from 
including the Adkins Property in a drilling unit. The Board does not have the authority under 
the Act to include lenown barren acreage in a drilling unit See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-
6(5)(b) (1993) (spacing order to include all lands determined by the Board to overlay a pool); 
see also Cameron v. Corporation Comm'n, 418 P.2d 932, 941 (Okla. 1966); Caudillo v. 
Corporation Comm'n, 551 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Okla. 1976). Based on the allegation in his 
Request that his lands do not contain oil, and therefore, do not overlay a pool, Adkins failed 
to establish an essential element of his claims for prospective relief. Accordingly, the Board 
properly dismissed Adkins* Request because he is not entitled to any prospective relief. 
KttH&ll.l 25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Educators Mutual Ins. Assoc, v. Allied Property <fc Casualty Ins., 890 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 
1995) (pleading failed to properly allege elements of cause of action). 
III. 
ADKINS' REQUEST WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE 
ADKINS FAILED TO PROVIDE NOTICE TO ALL PERSONS 
KNOWN TO HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST IN THE PROPOSED 
MODIFICATION OF THE 1976 SPACING ORDER. 
The Board properly dismissed Adkins* Request because Adkins did not provide notice 
to ail persons with a direct interest in the proposed agency action. Adkins admits that he only 
provided notice of the Request to UPRC. (R. 9.) Adkins asserts that such notice was 
sufficient because UPRC is "the only other owner whose interests are "directly affected* 
within the Board's administrative rule R641-104-135." (Petitioner's Brief at 28.) Rule R641-
104-135 of the Board's Rules states, in pertinent part: H[t]he person requesting agency action 
shall file the request with the Division and shall, unless waived, send a copy by mail to each 
person known to have a direct interest in the requested agency action."20 The rule requires 
that Adkins send a copy of his Request to each person known to have a direct interest in the 
requested spacing proceeding. Such notice of a spacing proceeding is required before the 
Board can determine or modify the parties' property rights. See e.g., Bennion v. Utah State 
Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1142 (Utah 1983); see also Uhden v. New 
Mexico Oil Conser. Comm'n, 817 P.2d 721, 723 (N.M. 1991); Boyce v. Corporation Comm'n 
ofOJdcL, 744 P.2d 985 (Okla. Ct App. 1987). Under these circumstances, where Adkins has 
20Utah Admin. Code R641-104-135 (1995). 
ZttVMUM * 0 
only provided notice to UPRC, Adkins clearly has failed to provide proper notice to all of the 
interested parties, as required by the Board's Rules. 
Adkins' proposal to combine his mineral interests in the SEV4SEV4 of Section 34 with 
two existing 80-acre drilling units to the south in the NEVi of Section 3, Township 2 North, 
Range 7 East, S.L.M., would isolate the remaining 40-acre tract in the SWMSE'/i of Section 
34, leaving the mineral interests in that isolated tract without a permissible well location. The 
permitted well location in the 80-acre drilling unit covering the Adkins Property is on Adkins' 
40-acre tract Adkins' proposed modified 200-acre drilling unit would deprive his adjoining 
mineral interest owners in the existing 80-acre drilling unit of their opportunity to produce 
their just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the Pineview Field. Adkins' proposed 
modified spacing order would substantially affect his adjoining mineral interest owners' 
correlative rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(2) (1993). Obviously, Adkins' adjoining 
mineral interest owners have a direct interest in the proposed proceeding, and the failure to 
provide them proper notice creates significant procedural concerns. 
In addition, because Adkins seeks modification of the 1976 Spacing Order, all parties 
whose mineral interests are determined by that order may be entitled to notice of the 
requested spacing proceeding, particularly because it seeks a non-uniform oddly-shaped and 
sized drilling unit Without question, Adkins has failed to comply with the Board's Rules 
because he has not provided notice to ail persons known to have a direct interest in the 
requested spacing proceeding. The Board reasonably and properly applied its own rule by 
dismissing Adkins' Request under these circumstances. The Board's Order dismissing 
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Adkins* Request for failure to provide adequate notice should be affirmed. Kent v. 
Department ofEmp. Sec, 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Adkins' failure to provide notice to all parties with a direct interest in the spacing 
proceeding could arguably render the other issues in this appeal moot. See Burkett v. 
Schwendiman, 113 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). However, if this Court affirms the Board's 
decision to dismiss Adkins' Request only on the grounds that Adkins failed to provide 
adequate notice, the remaining issues on appeal will remain undecided. The notice deficiency 
can be corrected. Satisfying the notice requirement, however, will quite likely significantly 
increase the number of participants in the administrative proceedings, but will not further 
resolution of the fundamental legal issue regarding the availability of retroactive relief, which 
is at the heart of Adkins' Request. More than likely, if the key issues raised by this appeal 
are not decided in this appeal, they will be asserted again by Adkins in a subsequent appeal. 
Notice to the parties with direct interests in the Pineview Filed is not central to the retroactive 
relief issue. In the interests of judicial and administrative economy, the Court should consider 
and decide the other issues presented by Adkins' appeal. See Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 
896, 899 (Utah 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the April 21, 1995 Order dismissing Adkins* Request 
for Agency Action should be affirmed because the Request failed to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted and because Adkins failed to provide notice to all parties with a direct 
interest in the proposed agency action. 
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